Verifiable trust communities
A verifiable trust community is a group of people, such as a family, a club or a company, that gives each member a signed membership credential. The member keeps the credential in their own wallet, under their own identifier. Anyone can check it against the community’s public key and revocation list, without telling the community which member they are checking. The community can still see that its list was fetched, and when; What stays private, and what does not says what that means for small groups. The community also keeps a record of who it admitted and when, protected by a keyed hash chain that its operator can check. That does not stop the operator rewriting it, and a stored copy of the latest hash is needed to notice deleted entries.
The open-source OpenVTC project builds the servers for this, from the First Person Network research. A community that runs them publishes a site such as first.openvtc.net , OpenVTC’s test community, where people join with a wallet, an administrator approves them, and they sign in with a passkey or wallet.
Status. OpenVTC credential and status-list verification are mounted in
Companion Memory at POST /vtc/verify and POST /vtc/status-list/evaluate
(VtcModule / VtcController), validating W3C VC 2.0 / DTG v1 envelopes,
validity windows, eddsa-jcs-2022 Data Integrity proofs, and caller-supplied
Bitstring Status Lists strictly offline with zero outbound network fetches.
The feature is off by default behind the ENABLE_VTC_CREDENTIALS=true
feature flag. When disabled, all routes return 404 Not Found.
How it sits next to KERI
Decentralized trust (KERI and ToIP) is about one Companion recognizing another. A community asks a different question, so Companion Memory keeps the two apart instead of stretching one design over both.
| Peer links and asks | Community membership | |
|---|---|---|
| Question it answers | Is this the Companion I paired with? | Is this person a current member of a community I recognize? |
| Identifier | A key id in Companion Memory’s own did:keri:D form | did:key, or a community identifier whose key you have pinned |
| Proof | HTTP message signature (RFC 9421) | Data Integrity proof, eddsa-jcs-2022 |
| Credential | Grants stored as database rows | W3C Verifiable Credential 2.0, in the DTG Credentials v1 working-draft format |
| Revocation | The grant row is marked revoked | A signed, public Bitstring Status List |
| Interoperable with other software | No. See the status note on the KERI page | Not yet shown. Its core encodings reproduce published test vectors, the rest has unit tests only, and nothing has been run against OpenVTC’s software |
KERI identifiers are deliberately not accepted as community identifiers. Companion Memory’s did:keri:D key id is its own convention and not a CESR identifier, and a verifier that treated it as a real KERI identifier would be presenting something that looks like proof of a key and is not one. KERI support, if it is added, would be a separate, conformant resolver.
What a membership credential holds
- The community as issuer and the member as subject, each by identifier.
- A start date and a finite end date. A community’s credentials are short-lived on purpose; OpenVTC issues for 30 days by default and renews them while the person remains a member.
- A statement that the community issued it as itself (
issuerScopeispublic), which is what makes it usable by someone who has never dealt with that member. - A pointer to one slot in the community’s public revocation list.
- The community’s signature over all of it.
From joining to being recognized
sequenceDiagram
autonumber
actor Member
participant Community as Community
participant Memory as Companion Memory
Member->>Community: Ask to join, with a wallet identifier
Community->>Community: An administrator approves
Community-->>Member: Signed membership credential
Note over Community: Publishes a signed status list.<br/>The member's slot reads 0 (not revoked)
Member->>Memory: Present the credential
Memory->>Memory: Check community, signature and dates
Memory->>Community: Download the public status list
Memory->>Memory: Slot reads 0, so the member is recognized
Note over Memory: The community is not told which member is checked.<br/>It serves the same list to everyone, but can see each fetch.To revoke a member, the community sets that credential’s bit in the list and publishes it again. A verifier that downloads the list after that sees the slot read 1. A renewal takes a new slot, so every slot issued to a member has to be revoked. How old a list a verifier will accept is covered under What the library checks.
What the library checks
A credential is accepted only when every one of these holds. The first failure is a refusal.
- It is a membership credential in the DTG v1 format, with exactly the expected contexts and one credential type.
- Its issuer is a community you have chosen to recognize.
- The community issued it as itself.
- The signature verifies under a key that belongs to that community: one you pinned for it, or the community’s own
did:key. - It is inside its validity period, which is finite and no longer than you allow (90 days by default).
- It belongs to the person presenting it, when Companion Memory knows who that is. A credential on its own is like a ticket: whoever holds the bytes can show it.
- Its revocation slot, and any suspension slot, is clear in a status list that the same community signed. That list must not have expired, and it must be no older than the verifier’s age limit, which is 24 hours unless the verifier changes it, counted from the date the list says it became valid. The age limit is separate from the expiry date because some communities’ lists carry no expiry date at all, and the lists OpenVTC’s software publishes are among them.
An unreachable, unsigned, expired, too-old or too-short status list is a refusal, and so is a list with no start date, because its age could not be checked. The status list is requested only after the signature has shown that a recognized community wrote its address.
The age limit is a trade-off. A saved copy of an old list could hide a revocation for up to that long, counted from the date on the list, and the limit is set by the verifier. A longer limit makes that window longer. A shorter one refuses any list older than the limit, even a genuine one that has simply not been republished.
What stays private, and what does not
- The reason for a refusal is meant for the owner’s log and never for the person presenting. It would tell them which check to work around, so the library returns it to the caller to record, and the visible status of an ask is meant to stay
answeredordelivered. - The community is not told which member is checked, but it can see that its list was fetched, and when. Every verifier downloads the same whole list, so the download does not say which slot was read. Slot numbers are handed out at random, so a number does not reveal when someone joined.
- With few members, that can narrow it down. The more members share a list, the more cover each one has. With a handful, who fetched the list and when can point at one of them. The library reserves four decoy slots at the start of a list, which only stops a new community’s first member from being slot 0. OpenVTC’s software instead sets about 5% of a new list’s slots at random, which also hides how many members there are. Neither hides who is checked.
- The check never asks the community about a member. There is no call that says “is this person still a member?” The verifier downloads the list and reads the slot itself.
What exists today
The page at first.openvtc.net describes a whole community service. The credential core of it has been written as a library for Companion Memory. That code has not been run against OpenVTC’s software.
| Capability | Status |
|---|---|
| Issue a membership credential, with a random revocation slot | Built as a library |
| Revoke a membership and publish a signed status list | Built as a library. A renewal takes a new slot, so every slot has to be revoked |
| Recognise a membership credential from a community you chose | Built as a library, not connected to the product or run against OpenVTC’s software |
| Record of decisions, chained with a keyed hash | Built as a library, not yet written to by the issuer or the checker |
| Join requests, administrator approval, sign-in with a passkey or wallet | Not built |
| Roles and capabilities, step-up approval, second-party consent for administrator changes | Not built |
| Renewal on the same slot, and publishing a suspension list | Not built |
| Relationship, delegation and invitation credentials | Not built |
| Trust registry, and recognizing a role earned in another community | Not built |
| Git repository governance, shared data rooms, public site and admin console | Not built |
Resolving did:webvh community identifiers | Not built. Community keys are pinned by the owner for now |
How far it has been checked
- The canonical JSON, base58,
did:keyand proof code reproduce published test vectors, and the status-list reader expands the specification’s own example. - The credential reader, recognizer, issuer, key resolver and audit chain have unit tests only.
- Nothing has been run against OpenVTC’s software, in either direction: not a credential issued here and checked there, and not the reverse.
- The status list that OpenVTC’s test community served on 5 November 2026 would be refused. It carries two proofs, one of them post-quantum, where this code accepts one, and its encoded list lacks the multibase prefix that the W3C specification requires. So this code cannot yet recognize a member of that community.
Standards
These are W3C Recommendations, plus RFC 8785, an informational RFC.
- Verifiable Credentials Data Model 2.0 (W3C)
- Data Integrity EdDSA Cryptosuites v1.0 (W3C), the
eddsa-jcs-2022suite - Bitstring Status List v1.0 (W3C)
- JSON Canonicalization Scheme, RFC 8785
Working drafts this page follows
Both come from the Trust Over IP Decentralized Trust Graph Working Group. They are drafts, not final standards, and they can change.
- DTG Credentials Core Specification , Working Draft 0.6.0 as of 5 November 2026. The membership credential format this page describes.
- Verifiable Trust Infrastructure (VTI) specification , Working Draft 0.2.0 as of 5 November 2026. A reference only: the library does not implement it.
Related
- Decentralized trust (KERI and ToIP) — the identity design this sits beside, and what of it runs today
- Asking and sharing architecture — how grants and disclosure ceilings work
- Asking other Companions — the
/asksscreens